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 Appellant Raymond Ross 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Raymond Ross appeals from a broad filing injunction 
issued against him by the Bankruptcy Court after he and his 
wife used the bankruptcy process to stave off the sheriff’s sale 
of their home.  Ross argues that, as a matter of law, a 
bankruptcy court may never issue a filing injunction against a 
Chapter 13 debtor who requests voluntary dismissal under 11 
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U.S.C. § 1307(b) because doing so would undermine the 
debtor’s statutory rights.  We disagree, and hold that a 
bankruptcy court does indeed have the authority to issue a 
filing injunction even in the context of approving a debtor’s 
§ 1307(b) voluntary dismissal because nothing in the 
Bankruptcy Code’s express terms says otherwise.   
 However, we also find that the Bankruptcy Court’s 
filing injunction against Ross cannot survive this appeal due to 
this case’s particular circumstances.  The Bankruptcy Court 
provided no reasoning for the broad nature of its filing 
injunction, which went well beyond what had been requested 
and what the Bankruptcy Court found appropriate in the case 
of Ross’s similarly-situated wife.  Accordingly, we will vacate 
the injunction and remand this matter for further proceedings. 
I.  
 Appellant Raymond Ross and his wife Sandra have 
lived in their home in Ambler, Pennsylvania, since 1993.  In 
2003, the Rosses took on a mortgage from Appellee 
AmeriChoice Federal Credit Union.  The Rosses fell behind on 
their payments, and in 2012 AmeriChoice filed a foreclosure 
action in Pennsylvania state court.  The state court entered 
default judgment against the Rosses, and AmeriChoice 
scheduled a sheriff’s sale to be held on October 30, 2013.  Ross 
v. AmeriChoice Fed. Credit Union, 530 B.R. 277, 280 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 2015).   
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 The day before the sheriff’s sale, Raymond1—acting 
alone, without Sandra—filed the first of the Rosses’ three 
relevant Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.  Raymond’s first 
petition triggered Chapter 13’s automatic stay and put a halt to 
the sheriff’s sale, but was dismissed about six months later 
after Raymond failed to make required payments.  
AmeriChoice rescheduled the sheriff’s sale for August 27, 
2014.     
 On the day of the rescheduled sale, Raymond filed a 
second Chapter 13 petition—the one that led to this appeal—
stalling the sale for a second time.  The Bankruptcy Court 
quickly granted AmeriChoice relief from the automatic stay, 
and the sheriff’s sale was rescheduled yet again, this time for 
October 29, 2014.  On that day, however, Sandra filed her own 
Chapter 13 petition, delaying the sale of the Rosses’ property 
a third time.  In re Sandra Dixon-Ross, No. 15-CV-581, 2016 
WL 1056776, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2016).  Sandra’s case 
was assigned to the same Bankruptcy Judge overseeing 
Raymond’s case, and a week later the court dismissed Sandra’s 
petition for failure to obtain required pre-petition credit 
counseling.  Id.   
 In Raymond’s second case, AmeriChoice filed a motion 
under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) to either convert Raymond’s case to 
Chapter 7 or dismiss it altogether due to what AmeriChoice 
saw as Raymond’s bad faith use of the bankruptcy process.  
The Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing on the motion.  
About two weeks prior to the hearing, Raymond filed a motion 
to postpone the hearing due to a scheduling conflict and his 
                                              
 1  For sake of clarity, we will refer to Appellant 
Raymond Ross hereinafter by his first name only, and his wife 
by her first name, Sandra. 
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anticipated absence from the state.  The Bankruptcy Court 
denied the motion to postpone a week later.  Raymond then 
requested, the day before his hearing, that his case be dismissed 
pursuant to § 1307(b). 
 Raymond did not appear at the hearing on 
AmeriChoice’s motion.  AmeriChoice did appear, and 
indicated that its preference would be for the Bankruptcy Court 
to convert Raymond’s case to Chapter 7; dismissal was its 
second choice.  If the Bankruptcy Court decided to dismiss, 
AmeriChoice requested that the court also issue one of two 
proposed filing injunctions:  a filing injunction “barring future 
filings [of both Raymond and Sandra Ross] for 180 days,” or a 
filing injunction “barring the use of the automatic stay in any 
future filings by either one of them.”  (Addendum to Amicus 
Br. at 24 (transcript of hearing).)  The Bankruptcy Judge 
expressed due process concerns with the prospect of issuing an 
order that extended to Sandra because the hearing was held 
only in Raymond’s case and Sandra had not been given notice.  
The Judge instead suggested that if AmeriChoice wanted a 
filing injunction entered against Sandra, it should return to 
Sandra’s case and request one there.  Neither the Bankruptcy 
Judge nor AmeriChoice mentioned or discussed Raymond’s 
request for dismissal at the hearing.  Following the hearing, the 
Bankruptcy Court issued an Order dismissing Raymond’s case 
“with prejudice,” and further providing that “the Debtor is not 
permitted to file another bankruptcy case without express 
permission from this Court.”  (App. 205.)   
 AmeriChoice took the Bankruptcy Judge’s advice and a 
week later filed a motion in Sandra’s case, requesting that a 
filing injunction be entered against her as well.  In re Sandra 
Dixon-Ross, 2016 WL 1056776, at *1.  AmeriChoice 
suggested as relief the same two alternatives it had proposed in 
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Raymond’s case:  a general restriction on all Sandra’s filings 
for 180 days, or an order granting blanket relief from the 
automatic stay for any claims against the Rosses’ Ambler 
property for the indefinite future.  Id.  It did not request the 
broad restriction that the court had already entered against 
Raymond.  The Bankruptcy Judge granted the motion, but this 
time the order extended only to what AmeriChoice requested:  
Sandra was “enjoined from filing another bankruptcy for 180 
days of the date of this Order,” and the automatic stay was not 
to “operate against actions to enforce [AmeriChoice’s] 
mortgage foreclosure judgment” on the Rosses’ property.  In 
re Sandra Dixon-Ross, No. 14-18608, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 21, 2015).  Sandra lost an appeal in the district court, and 
did not further appeal her case.  Raymond unsuccessfully 
appealed his second case to the District Court, Ross, 530 B.R. 
at 282, and then filed the present appeal. 
 In the midst of this litigation, AmeriChoice completed 
the sheriff’s sale, only to have the foreclosure undone when the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the Rosses never 
received proper notice in the state action.  AmeriChoice Fed. 
Credit Union v. Ross, 135 A.3d 1018, 1023-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2015).  The Rosses also filed a federal action against 
AmeriChoice and other defendants, and eventually the parties 
entered into a near-global settlement, where the Rosses 
promised to make payments on their debt and AmeriChoice 
promised to abandon its foreclosure action.  See Ross v. 
AmeriChoice Fed. Credit Union, No. 15-2650, ECF No. 28 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016). 
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 The lone unsettled issue is the Bankruptcy Court’s filing 
injunction against Raymond, which remains in place.2 
II.  
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157.  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(1) to review the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal order.  
And we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Our task is to “stand in the shoes” of the District Court and 
review the Bankruptcy Court’s decision anew.  In re Pransky, 
318 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Krystal 
Cadillac Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 142 F.3d 631, 635 (3d 
Cir. 1998)).  “[W]e review a bankruptcy court’s ‘legal 
determinations de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and 
its exercises of discretion for abuse thereof.’”  In re Miller, 730 
F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Michael, 699 F.3d 
305, 308 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012)).  The issuance of a filing 
injunction is an exercise of discretion.  Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 
901 F.2d 329, 331 (3d Cir. 1990). 
III.  
 Raymond’s appeal raises two main issues:  (1) whether 
the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a bankruptcy court from issuing 
a filing injunction against a debtor who requests voluntary 
                                              
 2  Raymond proceeds pro se in this appeal.  Because of 
the important and unsettled nature of the power of a bankruptcy 
court to issue a filing injunction in response to a Chapter 13 
debtor’s motion for voluntary dismissal, we appointed counsel 
to serve as an Amicus Curiae on behalf of Raymond in this 
appeal.  We express our gratitude to court-appointed amicus, 
who provided valuable assistance to the Court. 
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dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b), and (2) whether this 
case’s particular facts and circumstances indicate that the 
Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in issuing a broad filing 
injunction.  We hold that the answer to the first question is no, 
but find the answer to the second is yes.   
A.  
 Raymond’s first argument is that bankruptcy courts may 
not impose a filing injunction after a debtor has motioned for 
voluntary dismissal pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b).  
Bankruptcy courts possess a general statutory authority to 
“issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the Bankruptcy 
Code.  11 U.S.C. § 105(a).  And bankruptcy courts “may also 
possess ‘inherent power . . . to sanction ‘abusive litigation 
practices.’”  Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014) 
(quoting Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 
375-76 (2007)).  But these broad “equitable powers . . . are not 
without limitation.”  In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 
190, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).  As relevant here, for example, a 
bankruptcy court’s general authority does not extend to actions 
that conflict with “specific,” “explicit,” and “express” terms of 
the Bankruptcy Code.  Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1195-97.     
 In this vein, Raymond argues the Bankruptcy Court’s 
filing injunction is not authorized by its general authority 
because it conflicts with the express terms of § 1307(b).  
Section 1307(b) states that a bankruptcy court “shall” dismiss 
a Chapter 13 case on the “request” of the debtor unless the 
debtor’s case has already been converted from some other 
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chapter of the code.  11 U.S.C. § 1307(b).3  There is a split in 
authority as to just how mandatory this right to dismissal really 
is, and the Third Circuit has yet to weigh in.  Some courts hold 
that the statute’s command is mandatory and grants a debtor an 
“absolute” right to dismissal—if a debtor requests dismissal, 
then the court must dismiss; no exceptions.  See, e.g., In re 
Barbieri, 199 F.3d 616, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1999) (reasoning that 
reading a bad faith exception into § 1307(b) would undermine 
§ 303’s procedures governing the initiation of an involuntary 
Chapter 7 case); In re Procel, 467 B.R. 297, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (applying Barbieri’s rule after holding that Barbieri was 
not overruled or abrogated by Marrama, 549 U.S. at 365); In 
re Williams, 435 B.R. 552, 560 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (same).  
Other courts read the statute to contain an exception that 
permits a bankruptcy court to delay ruling on a bad faith 
debtor’s request for dismissal and instead first address a 
creditor’s competing motion to dismiss the case or convert it to 
Chapter 7.  See, e.g., In re Jacobsen, 609 F.3d 647, 649 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that Marrama requires the court to read-in 
a bad faith exception); In re Rosson, 545 F.3d 764, 772, 773 
n.12 (9th Cir. 2009) (same).  Raymond argues we should side 
with Barbieri, and therefore the Bankruptcy Court erred in 
granting AmeriChoice’s motion over Raymond’s dismissal 
                                              
 3 The precise language of section 1307(b) is as follows:   
 
On request of the debtor at any time, if the case 
has not been converted under section 706, 1112, 
or 1208 of this title, the court shall dismiss a case 
under this chapter.  Any waiver of the right to 
dismiss under this subsection is unenforceable. 
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request because a debtor’s § 1307(b) right to dismissal is 
absolute. 
 But we need not weigh in on this split in authority today, 
because even if Raymond were correct, and § 1307(b) required 
the Bankruptcy Court to grant Raymond’s request for dismissal 
before considering AmeriChoice’s motion, the Bankruptcy 
Court could have just as easily attached its filing injunction to 
Raymond’s requested dismissal order.  Raymond argues that 
such a conclusion cannot be correct because it would 
undermine the purpose of several other Bankruptcy Code 
provisions that already address the problem of repeat-filers and 
bad-faith debtors:  § 727(a)(8) and § 1328(f), which limit the 
availability of two discharges to the same petitioner; 
§ 362(b)(4), which diminishes the effect of the automatic stay 
for repeat-filers; and § 109(g), which effectively imposes a 
180-day filing injunction on a certain subset of repeat-filers 
who act in bad faith.  But whether or not the Bankruptcy 
Court’s filing-injunction order undermines these sections’ 
purposes is not the question; all that matters is the “express” 
and “explicit” terms of the Bankruptcy Code.  For example, in 
Marrama v. Citizens Bank, the Supreme Court upheld an order 
as falling under the bankruptcy court’s general authority, and 
brushed back an argument that its decision would undermine 
the purpose of other Code provisions.  See 549 U.S. at 375; see 
also id. at 380 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority did 
not adequately consider the “purpose” of other Code 
provisions).  What mattered to the Court was that there was 
“[n]othing in the text” of the Code that prohibited the 
bankruptcy court’s order.  Id. at 374-75.  By comparison, when 
the Supreme Court reversed an order in Law v. Siegel for 
exceeding the bankruptcy court’s general authority, it held that 
the order conflicted with the “explicit mandates” and “express 
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terms” of 11 U.S.C. § 522, in light of two specific aspects of 
that section.  134 S. Ct. at 1196 (referencing specific textual 
language granting debtors the right to seek exemptions and a 
“meticulous” and “detailed” list of exceptions and limitations).  
Raymond’s case is much more like Marrama than Law v. 
Siegel.  Raymond highlights “nothing in the text” of § 1307(b) 
that prohibits the entry of a filing injunction alongside a 
§ 1307(b) dismissal order, and the purposes behind the other 
cited statutory provisions are irrelevant. 
 Raymond also argues against this conclusion by 
comparing § 1307(b) to the analogous Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure governing voluntary dismissals by a plaintiff, Rule 
41(a)(1).4  Rule 41 states in its text that a notice of voluntary 
                                              
 4 Rule 41(a)(1) provides: 
 
(a) Voluntary Dismissal. 
(1) By the Plaintiff. 
(A) Without a Court Order. Subject to Rules 
23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and any applicable 
federal statute, the plaintiff may dismiss an 
action without a court order by filing: 
(i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party 
serves either an answer or a motion for summary 
judgment; or 
(ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties 
who have appeared. 
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dismissal is effective without a court order and the dismissal is 
without prejudice if the plaintiff requests dismissal and has not 
previously had “any federal- or state-court action based on or 
including the same claim” voluntarily dismissed.  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 41(a)(1)(B).  Thus, Raymond suggests that had the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure governed the Bankruptcy Court’s 
procedures in Raymond’s case, the Bankruptcy Judge arguably 
would have been prohibited from entering the filing injunction 
because Raymond’s § 1307(b) request for voluntary dismissal 
was his first.5  The problem with this Rule 41 analogy, 
however, is once again the text of § 1307(b):  whereas Rule 41 
                                              
(B) Effect. Unless the notice or stipulation states 
otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice. But 
if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- 
or state-court action based on or including the 
same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an 
adjudication on the merits. 
 5 Raymond’s first bankruptcy petition was dismissed 
involuntarily in response to a motion to dismiss filed by the 
Trustee; it was not dismissed voluntarily.  See In re Raymond 
Ross, No. 13-19412, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2014) 
(dismissal order).  Prior to dismissal, Raymond and 
AmeriChoice apparently entered into a stipulation in an 
attempt to relieve AmeriChoice from the automatic stay and 
avoid future litigation between the parties.  AmeriChoice’s 
Mot. to Convert or Dismiss, Ex. P ¶¶ 10-13, Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
Case No. 14-16866, Docket No. 41.  But that stipulation did 
not purport to resolve Raymond’s first Chapter 13 case in its 
entirety, and was not the basis for the Bankruptcy Court’s 
dismissal. 
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requires in specific and express terms that dismissal is 
automatic and without prejudice, § 1307(b) contains no similar 
textual hook.   
 The Bankruptcy Court therefore possessed the general 
authority to issue a filing injunction against Raymond. 
B.  
 The Bankruptcy Court’s filing injunction against 
Raymond is still problematic, however, due to the specific 
circumstances of this case.  A court may not issue orders that 
are “arbitrary or irrational,” and we may vacate decisions for 
an abuse of discretion on that basis.  United States v. Bailey, 
840 F.3d 99, 117 (3d Cir. 2016).  Furthermore, when reviewing 
for abuse of discretion, we grant less deference to court 
decisions that are unaccompanied by reasoning.  Id.  Although 
we may affirm a judgment of a lower court for any reason 
supported by the record, Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 
191 (3d Cir. 2011), we are not obligated to search the record 
for reasons to affirm and may vacate or remand if the lower 
court declines to provide reasoning supporting its decision.6   
                                              
 6 See United States v. Garza, 593 F.3d 385, 391 (5th Cir. 
2010) (holding that the district court abused its discretion when 
it sua sponte transferred a case to a not very convenient venue 
and did not provide reasoning); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking 
Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 816 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(vacating the district court’s award of damages under the 
Lanham Act for lack of reasoning); Stuebben v. Gioiosi (In re 
Gioioso), 979 F.2d 956, 961 (3d Cir. 1992) (remanding to the 
bankruptcy court because it failed to “provide a sufficient basis 
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 Here, three aspects of the filing injunction, none of 
which were explained by the Bankruptcy Court, together 
suggest the Bankruptcy Judge abused his discretion in issuing 
the broad and indefinite filing injunction.  First, the filing 
injunction went beyond what AmeriChoice requested.  
AmeriChoice only asked that the Bankruptcy Court either 
restrict Raymond’s filings for 180 days or bar the application 
of the automatic stay to AmeriChoice’s attempts to sell the 
Rosses’ property.  The Bankruptcy Court, however, barred 
Raymond from making any bankruptcy filings anywhere for 
the indefinite future—there was no temporal or geographic 
limitation—except when the court grants its express 
permission.   
 Second, the filing injunction against Raymond is 
several degrees harsher than the filing injunction against 
Sandra, even though the same Bankruptcy Judge oversaw each 
spouse’s case and gave no indication that the two are not 
similarly situated.  Similarly, even though it appears that 
Raymond and Sandra are similarly situated, the Bankruptcy 
Court limited its filing injunction in Sandra’s case to what 
AmeriChoice requested while in Raymond’s case went beyond 
their request. 
 Third, 11 U.S.C. § 109(g) is persuasive authority that a 
180-day filing restriction may have been sufficient in 
Raymond’s case.  As mentioned above, that section imposes 
an effective 180-day filing restriction on debtors who have 
either (1) willfully failed “to abide by orders of the court” or 
“to appear before the court in proper prosecution of the case,” 
or (2) requested and received dismissal in advance of a court 
                                              
for reviewing its exercise of discretion” in imposing sanctions 
under Rule 9011). 
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ruling on a creditor’s request for relief from the automatic stay.  
11 U.S.C. § 109(g).  Thus, the section imposes a 180-day filing 
restriction on a certain subset of bad faith debtors.  The section 
almost certainly did not apply here because Raymond appeared 
before the Bankruptcy Court, apparently followed the court’s 
orders, and did not file his motion in response to 
AmeriChoice’s previously-granted motion for relief from the 
automatic stay but rather its motion to dismiss or convert 
Raymond’s case.  Nonetheless, if 180 days is often sufficient 
for the bad faith debtor contemplated by §109(g), 180 days 
may have been sufficient for Raymond too. 
 These three aspects of the Bankruptcy Court’s filing 
injunction together, left unexplained by any court reasoning, 
lead us to the conclusion that the court abused its discretion in 
issuing such a broad filing injunction.  If any one of these 
factors had not been present, or if the Bankruptcy Court had 
provided oral or written reasoning describing a legitimate 
rationale for the broad nature of its filing injunction, then 
perhaps we would have arrived at a different result, because 
even broad filing restrictions are common and often justified.  
See, e.g., Olson v. Ramsey Cty., No. 15-3131, 2015 WL 
5778478, at *7 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2015) (restricting the 
plaintiff, for the indefinite future, from “filing new cases in this 
District Court unless he is represented by counsel or receives 
prior written authorization from a judicial officer in this 
District Court”); Riches v. Parcells, No. 1:07-cv-1891, 2008 
WL 117887, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008) (restricting the 
Clerk of Court, for the indefinite future, from accepting any of 
the plaintiff’s future civil complaints if the plaintiff has not 
paid the filing fee).  Nevertheless, a broad filing injunction is 
an “extreme remed[y]” that “should be narrowly tailored and 
sparingly used.”  In re Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 F.2d 745, 747 
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(3d Cir. 1989).  Given both the breadth of the injunction in this 
case and the Bankruptcy Court’s failure to articulate why such 
an injunction was warranted by Ross’s conduct, a remand is 
warranted.7   
IV.  
 We will vacate the Bankruptcy Court’s filing-injunction 
order and remand the case to the Bankruptcy Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
                                              
 7 Because we vacate the filing injunction on this basis, 
we need not address Raymond’s final argument in the 
alternative, that the Bankruptcy Court violated his procedural 
due process rights. 
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